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Introduction
In the  last 15 years, theI'e appears to have been a trend  among devel-
oping  countries  toward  the  creation  of semi-autonomous  revenue au-
thorities  (RAs) to replace  their  existing  tax collection  agencies. Semi-
autonomous  RAs are found  in many Latin  American  (Bolivia  in 1987,
Argentina  in 1988, Peru in 1988, Colombia  in 1991, Venezuela in 1994,
Mexico  in 1997, Guatem,ala in  1999 and Guyana in  1999) and Mrican
countries  (Ghana  in 1985, Uganda  in 1991, Zambia  in 1993, Kenya in
1995, Tanzania  in  1996, South Mrica  in  1997, Rwanda in  1998, and
Malawi in 2000).  In addition,  there are two Southeast Asian (Singapore
in  1992 and  Malaysia  in  1994) and  one  European  exception  (Spain
1991) [Silvani and Baer 1997 and Jenkins and Khadka 2000].  In many
of these countries,  the  radical  reform  of the  tax agency was primarily
in~ended to improve  revenue performance  in the face of deep-seated
probl~ms  in  tax administration.
The  Philippines  has not  been  immune  to  the worldwide  move-
ment towards the  creation  of semi-autonomous  revenue authority.  To
date, two bills  have been filed  in Congress seeking to  establish a semi-
autonomous  internal  revenue administration  to replace the Bureau of
Internal  Revenue.  House  Bill  5054 proposes  to  create  the  Internal
Revenue Management  Authority  (IRMA)  while  House  Bill  5465 calls
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for the  organization  of the National  Authority  for Tax Administration
(NARA).  More  recently,  a substitute  bill  calling  for  the  establishment
of the National  Revenue Authority  (NRA) was being deliberated  on at
the Committee  on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.
This  paper reviews the experience  of other  countries,  which have
set up semi-autonomous  revenue authorities.  First and foremost,  this
note will  examine  not  only the  context  and rationale  for the  creation
of these institutions  but also the  design issues that have helped  shape
them.  Second, drawing  lessons from  international  experience,  it will
evaluate the risks and opportunities  in improving  tax collections  aris-
ing from  the establishment  of semi-autonomous  RAs. Third,  the paper
will  assess  how the  proposed  bills  on the  creation  of an independent
revenue  authority  measures up against international  best practice.  In
this sense, this  short  note  is meant to  help  inform  the debate  on the
proposed  restructuring  of the  Bureau of Internal  Revenue.
Rationale  for  semi-autonomous  RAs in other countries
Tax experts (e.g., Silvani and Baer 1997 and Jenkins  1994) suggest  the
imperative  for radical changes in tax administration  in countries where
the tax gap! is large (i.e., 40 percent  or more  of the potential  tax). The
stylized facts  that  characterize  tax  administration  in  these countries
include:  1) rigid  civil  service  (i.e.,  recruitment,  retention,  and com-
pensation)  rules and regulations  for the public  sector that tend to re-
sult in low salaries for  tax officials,  thus, making  it difficult  for the tax
collection  agency to attract competent, professional personnel;  2) wide-
spread  perception  of  corruption  in  tax administration  with  negotia-
tion  of tax payments between  tax examiners and taxpayers said to be
prevalent;  and consequently, and 3) low voluntary  compliance  because
of the perceived lack of fairness in the enforcement  of tax laws Uenkins
1994),2
Frustrated  by the  inefficiency  and  the  perceived  corruption  inthe 
tax collection  agency, supporters of semi-autonomous  RAs in many
1 "Tax gap.  is  defined  as  the  difference  between  the  tax 1hat should  be  paid  according  to  the  tax  statutes
and  the  tax which  is actually  collected.
2 Singapore  and  Malaysia  are  exceptions  to  the  typical  profile  of  countries  that  have  adopted  the  semi-
autonomous  revenue  authority  model  not only  in the  geographical  sense.  Tax administration  in Singapore
is generally  viewed  as  efficient  and  its tax  gap  is estimated  to be  less  than  10 percent.  On  the other  hand,
Malaysia's  civil  service  is highly  regarded.  It appears  that  in these  countries  the  motivation  for the  reform
is  underpinned  by  the  desire  for  improving  the  quality  of taxpayer  services,  thus  improving  the  overall
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of these countries justified  the reform  on the grounds  that making  tax
administration  more  "businesslike"  and free of the  financing  and per-
sonnel rules that govern the public  sector would reduce the motive  for
corruption  by  giving  emphasis  to  performance~linked  budgets  and
compensation  schemes.  Essentially,  it  is argued  that  prereform  tax
administration  in these countries  was inefficient  because existing  bud-
getary and  personnel  regulations  make it  difficult  for  government  to
provide  tax collectors  with  the  appropriate  incentive  structure  (not
only  in  terms  of  providing  a suitable  compensation  level but also in
terms of the ease of hiring  qualified  personnel  and firing  erring  ones)
and the  flexibility  to make its own decisions  on how to spend  its bud-
get and  how to structure  and staff its organization.
On  the  other  hand,  Taliercio  (2000a) posits that what motivates
politicians  to give more  autonomy  to  the  RAs is the  need  to  make a
credible  commitment  to taxpayers that the  tax collection  agency will
be more  competent,  efficient,  and fair. The  credibility  problem  in tax
administration  stems from  the time  consistency problem.  This  means
that the incentives  of politicians  (i.e., the President)  to undertake  the
reform  change  in  the  course  of  the  reform  process. Initially,  politi~
cians  may support  the  reform  because they need  more  revenues to
support  a larger  expenditure  program,  which  could  then  conceivably
generate  greater  political  benefits.  However, as the  reform  becomes
successful, the politicians  have the incentive  to withdraw  support  from
the  reform  as its cost start to outweigh  its benefits.  From this perspec-
tive, granting  autonomy  to the RA represents an attempt  of the politi~
cians to  employ a "commitment  technology,"  (i.e., a means of making
their  commitment  credible)  to  convince  taxpayers of  their  faithful-
ness to the  reform  so as to increase tax compliance  and consequently
increase tax revenues. Thus, by turning  tax administration  over to an
independent  agency, RA  autonomy  reform  aims  to  depoliticize  tax
collection  and minimize  the risks that politicians  will undo  the reform
at a later date.
Consequently,  Taliercio  (2000a)  argues  that  the  causal mecha-
nism by which the semi~autonomous RA reform  signals a credible  com-
mitment  is anchored  on the specific bureaucratic  features  of the  new
revenue authority.  For instance, the  fact that taxpayers know that  the
revenue authority's  budget is a function  of revenues collected,  that its
officials  are trained  professionals  operating  in a meritocratic  organi~
zation,  and  that  it  is headed  by someone who  is free  from  political
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by signaling  to taxpayers that the RA has solid incentives  to maximize
revenue  by detecting  noncompliance  on the  part of taxpayers.
Key design features  of semi-autonomous  RAs
The  first  semi-autonomous  RAs were generally  modeled  after  central
banks Uenkins 1994). However, the World  Bank (2002) notes that "RAs
are  not  meant  to  be as autonomous  as other  types of public  sector
organizations  like  the  central  bank,  nor  as dependent  as ministerial
line departments.  Hence the monicker  'semi-autonomous.'"  However,
they are distinguished  from  traditional  tax  collection  agencies by a
higher  degree of administrative  and financial  independence  (i.e., au-
tonomy)  from  the  central  government.  The  key design features  that
define  semi-autonomous  RAs are:  1)  legal  character,  2)  governance
structure,  3)  financing  mechanism,  4)  personnel  system, and  5) ac-
countability  relationships  (World  Bank 2002).
Legal character
All  of  the  semi-autonomous  RAs were created  by law, which  also de-
fines the legal character  of the RA concerned.  All are situated  within
the public  sector. However,  they may take different  forms.
For  instance,  Peru's  National  Tax  Administration  Superinten-
dency  (SUNAT)  is a decentralized  public  organization.  The  South M-
rica  Revenue Service  (SARS) is a public  sector  organization  outside
the public  service. The  Kenya Revenue Authority  (KRA)  is a govern-
ment corporate  body while  Venezuela's National  Intergrated  Tax Ad-
ministration  (SENIAT)  is an autonomous  institute.  Of these four,  all
with the  exception  of the  SENIAT have their  own separate legal char-
acter and can own assets.  It appears that RAs without  their  legal char-
acter are more  subordinate  to the ministries  of finance  (World  Bank
2002).  Similarly,  the  right  to  own assets  strengthens  the  managerial
autonomy  of the  tax administration.
Governance  stntcture
All  of the semi-autonomous  RAs established to date follow  anyone  of
two governance  models:  the  chief  executive  officer  (CEO)  model  or
the board  of directors  (BOD)  model.  The CEO model was adopted by
almost  all  of  the  Latin  American  countries  while  the  BOD  model  is
popular  in Mrica  and Asia.
In  many of the countries  that have followed  the CEO model,  the
commissioner  (or  superintendent)  of  the  revenue  authority  is ap-177 MANASAN
pointed  by the  president  of the republic  although  in some cases  he is
appointed  by the  minister  of finance.  In  either  case,  the  appointment
of the  commissioner  may be for a fixed  or a variable  number  of years.
Under  the  BOD model,  the board  of directors  is responsible  for
overseeing the  management  of the RA but does not intervene  in the
day-to-day activities  of the revenue authority.  The  boards vary in size,
composition,  and appointing  authority.  For instance, .the board  of di-
rectors  of  Mexico's  Tax Administration  Service  (SAT) consists of  six
members: the  minister  of finance,  two representatives from  the minis-
try  of finance  who  are designated  by the  minist~r  finance,  the  presi-
dent of the SAT  who is appointed  by the president  of the republic,  and
two senior  SAT employees designated  by the  president  of the SAT. In
contrast,  the  board  of  Kenya's KRA has 11 members:  the  chairman
appointed  by the  president  of  the  republic,  the  commissioner  of the
KRA, the attorney-general,  two high-level  civil service officers  from  the
ministry  of  finance,  and  six other  persons appointed  by the  minister
of finance  (World  Bank 2002) .
Some boards consist solely of public  officials  (e.g., Mexico)  while
others  include  private  sector representatives  in  addition  to members
from  the  public  sector who  are members  on  an  ex-officio  basis (e.g.,
Kenya, Malaysia, Uganda).'  In Zambia, the board  includes, in addition
to public  sector officials,  private  sector representatives who are nomi-
nated  directly  by the  cllambers  of commerce  and industry,  the bank-
ers'  associatipn, the  institute  of certified  public  accountants, and the
lawassociation.4
Jenkins  and  Khadka  (2000)  point  out  that  membership  in  the
board  should  be limited  not  only because a large board  tends to be
unwieldy  in terms  of  scheduling  meetings  and  making  decisions  but
also because the  larger the board  is, the less individual  accountability
tends to be.
The  desirability  of  having private  sector representatives  on the
board  of the RA is an open issue.  Jenkins and Khadka  (2000) point  out
that while  opening  the  board  membership  to  the  private  sector may
enhance theRA's  customer service orientation,  help control  costs  and
check corruption,  it may also give rise to conflict  of interest and breach
of  taxpayer confidentiality.  On the other  hand, Taliercio  (2001) notes
that  private  sector  membership  in  the  board  may promote  the  cre-~
3 Refer  to  Jenkins  and  Khadka  2000
4 These  organizations  are  specified  in the  Zambia  Revenue  Authority  Act1781  PHILIPPINE]OURNALOF DEVELOPMENT
ation of a broader-based  constituency  for  reform  outside  of the politi~
cal arena that  help ensure the sustain  ability  of the  reform  as had hap-
pened  in Peru.
The  appointing  authority  for  the head of the revenue  authority
under  the  BOD  model  may either  be the  president  of  the  republic
(Mexico),  the  minister  of finance  (South Africa,  Kenya, Singapore),
or the  board  itself  (Malawi).  As with  the  RAs using the  CEO  model,
the  term of the  commissioner  may be fixed  or open to the  discretion
of  the  appointing  authority.  The  World  Bank  (2002)  notes  that  the
presidential  appointment  of the  commissioner  is a mechanism  that
seems  to increase autonomy.  Similarly, fixed-term  appointment  for the
commissioner  tends to promote  the independence  of the RA.
Financing
Semi-autonomous  RAs generally receive budgets which are set as  fixed
(e.g., 2 percent  for the  SUNAT of Peru)  or variable  percentages (e.g.,
between three  and five  percent as determined  by the  president  of the
republic  for the  SENIAT of Venezuela) of their  actual collections.  The
funding  of the KRA of Kenya as well as the MRA of Malawi is equal to a
variable  percentage  of difference  between actual and targeted  collec-
tions  in  addition  to a fixed  percentage  of  actual  collections,  but the
total should  not  exceed a given percentage  of  total  collections.  How-
ever, a few RAs like  the SARS of South Mrica  are funded  just  like  any
ordinary  government  agency (i.e., through  legislative appropriations).
Clearly, having the RA budget as a fixed  percentage of actual tax
collections  (as in  Peru)  is autonomy-enhancing.  Moreover,  the  prac-
tice tends to enhance  revenue performance  since it provides the rev-
enue authority  more  incentives to  collect taxes efficiently  even as tax-
payer compliance  is enhanced  by this  very fact  Uenkins  and Khadka
2000).  On the  other  hand, while  the  system in Kenya and Malawi may
initially  look  attractive  in  the  sense that  it  is performance-linked,  it
may actually lead to strategic  behavior  on the  part  of the revenue au-
thority  in the  area of revenue  target setting  and  may be counterpro-
ductive.
The  other  issue with  respect to financing  refers to how the funds
are released to the revenue authority.  Needless to say,  a system  whereby
formula-based  funding  is released automatically  to the revenue admin-
istration  would  be the  most autonomy  enhancing.  The  SUNAT is the
only RA which  receives its funds  directly  from  the treasury. Providing
for  autonomous  financing  mechanisms in the  legislation  is, however,179 MANASAN
no  guarantee  that  the  principle  is honored  in practice  (World  Bank
2002).  For  instance,  the  SENIAT and  the  MRA has not  received  the
resources due  them under  the law.
Personnel  systems
"The  availability  and  retention  of trained  human resources are by far
the most important  factors  in determining  the efficiency of tax admin-
istration"  Uenkins and Khadka 2000).  However, in many countries,  ex-
isting  civil  service rules  impinge  negatively  on the  ability  of  the  tax
administratiQn  to  recruit  the  most cQmpetent personnel,  to provide
competitive  base pay to all, to give additional  incentives  fQr good per-
formance,  tQ sanction bad behavior, and to dismiss erring  staff. Corol-
lary to  this, autonomy  in hiring,  firing,  rewarding,  and motivating  the
staff is viewed by  many as perhaps  the  mQst critical  feature  Qf semi-
autonomQUS  RAs.
The  SUNAT of  Peru has perhaps the  most independent  person-
nel system amQng all semi-autonomous  RAs. The  law the accorded  it
the  authority  to  adQPt a nonpublic  sector personnel  regime.  Conse-
quently,  the  SUNAT has the  authority  tQ set its Qwn salary structure
and to appoint  and remove its employees without  the need to consult
with any other public  sector entity. Thus, "the revenue authority  model
wQrked well in the Peruvian context because it empowered professional
managers to  ~arry out far-reaching  efficiency  and integrity-enhancing
reforms  while  maintaining  accountability  to the government."
Accountability  mechanisms
Following  the principle  that the best strategy against corruption  should
combine  both  positive  and  negative  incentives  ;(World  Bank  1999),
g~ater  administrative  and  financial  independence  should  be accom-
panied  by the establishment of accountability  mechanisms in the semi-
autonomous RAs. The components of a good accountability  system  are:
(1) code  of ethics for  all employees of the  tax authority,  {2)  a strong
internal  audit  unit  with a high profile  within  the revenue authority  to
enforce  the code of  ethics,  (3) independent  external  audit of the rev-
enue  authori~  itself,  and  (4)  clear reporting  relationships  to  other
government  ~gencies (Silvani and Baer 1997).
In  Kenya, the  commissioner  of  the  KRA audits  the  internal  ac-
counts  of the: revenue  authority  every three  months  and  presents the
findings  to itS board  of directors,  the  minister  of finance,  and the au-
ditor-general.  Many of  the  semi-autonomous  RAs in the  other  coun-PHILIPPINE  JOURNAL  OF DEVELOPME 180
tries submit periodic  reports  to the minister  of finance, who then pre-
sents the  report  to  the  legislature  (e.g.,  Malawi  and  South Mrica).
Mexico's  SAT is the only RA that has a direct  accountability  link  to the
legislature  (World  Bank 2002).
Risks and opportunities  in the  creation  of  semi-autonomous  RAs
The record  of semi-autonomous  revenue authorities  in improving  tax
effort  and  in combating  corruption  is mixed.. On one hand, Taliercio
(2000b), using the results of a survey conducted  in 1998-1999 in four
countries  in  Latin  America,5found  that semi-autonomous  RA reform
has had uneven  impact  not  only  in  combating  corruption  (Table  1)
but also in  improving  taxpayer services (Table 2).
On  the  other  hand,  a review of the  movement  in  tax effort  over
time  in some of the countries  that have effected  RA reform  also show
considerable  variation.6  In  some countries,  the  tax-to-GDP ratio  rose
dramatically  with the  establishment  of the  new rev~nue authority.  For
Proportion  of respondents  opining  on whether  there  is more  or  less














































Source:  Taliercio  2000b
"The  respondents  to  the  survey  consist  of  large  corporate  taxpayers,  professional  tax consultants,  and
private  sector  and  pr01fessional  organizations  concerned  with  taxation  issues.  All  of  the  tax  consulting
firms  and  the  private  sector  organizations  were  interviewed.  On  the  other  hand,  the  sample  size  for  the
large  corporate  taxpayers  was  determined  so  as  to  ensure  that  the  error  level  was  not  more  than  10
percent.
s Undeniably,  RA reform  in  most  of these  countries  was  undertaken  to improve  the  revenue  performance
of  the  tax  collection  agency  In  this  sense,  tax  effort  is deemed  a  good  indicator  of  the  success  of  the
reform.  It should  be  emphasized  that  in some  of1hese  countries,  RA  reform  was  complemented  by a tax
policy  reform  which  was  aimed  at  making  tax  structure  easier  to  administer  and  thus  more  revenu~-
productive.  Thus,  the  direction  of the  expected  impact  on tax  effort  of both  reforms  is the same.  Nonethe-
less,  in  countries  where  both  types  of  reform  were  undertaken,  not  all  of  the  observed  changes  in  tax
effort  may  be attributed  to  RAreform  alone  Moreover,  other  intervening  variables  (eg.,  changes  in eco-
nomic  structure)  might  also  have  affected  the  tax  effort.  Thus,  the  discussion  on  tax  effort  should  be
viewed  with  some  caution.Proportion  of respondents  opining  on whether  overall  quality  of ser-
vices  provided  by  the  tax  agency  is  better  or  worse  than  that  pro-
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instance,  in Peru, the  tax-to-GDP ratio  rose from  9 percent  in 1987 to
15 percent  in  1997 (Table 3).7 Similarly,  in Uganda,  tax effort  surged
from  4 percert  of GDP in  1990 to 11 percent  in  1996 while  in Ghana
tax effort,ju~ped  from  7 percent  in  1984 to  16 percent  in 1996.  In
other  countries,  the  improvement  in  tax effort  was more  modest. For
example,  in Venezuela, the ratio  increased from  14 percent  in 1993 to
17 percent  in 1997 while  in Colombia,  the ratio  went up from  10 per-
cent in  1990 to  13 percent  in 1993. Similarly,  in  South Africa,  tax ef-
fort  rose from  24 percent  in  1996 to 26 percent  in 1999.
In y  t o~her countries,  the improvement  in tax effort  is marginal.
Thus,  the tax-to-GDP ratio  went up by about one percentage  point  in
Tanzania  etween 1995  and 1996, in Argentina  between 1987 and 1994;
while  the  ratio  rose by less than one percentage  point  in Mexico  be-
tween 19  6 and  1997 and in Rwanda between  1997 and 1998.
Mea  while,  in some countries  (e.g., Malaysia and  Zambia),  the
creation  f  the  semi-autonomous  revenue  authority  appears to  have
no  tangi  Ie ~mpact on tax effort.  In  contrast,  tax effort  declined  de-
spite the  recjltion of a semi-autonomous  RA in Kenya.
Tab e 3isuggests that one of the risks associated with the creation
of semi-a  tonomous  RAs is the sharp drop  in tax effort  in the first year
of their  0  eration.8 Thus, it seems that the process of changing over to
a new sy terd  may involve  significant  costs in  terms  of  reduced  rev-
71t should  be~ mPhaSized  that the  following  discussion  of the  impact  of semi-autonomous  RA on tax  effort
is limited  bec  use changes  in tax  policy  have  not been  taken  into  account.
8  Apparently,  s  me  of the  earlier  studies  may  have  exaggerated  the  improvement  in tax  effort  following  the
introduction  0  semi-autonomous  RAs  by  reckoning  the  change  in  tax  effort  relative  to  the  "low"  point
registered  in  t  e first  year  of  its  implementationI  rHIUPPINEjOURNALOF  DEVELOPMENT
Table ~. Impact of the creation  of semi-autonomous  RA on tax effort
Year
established
Effect  on tax  effort Co4ntry
Latin .A\merica
Bolivia  I 1987-1988. Tax  effort was  8 percent  in 1987  and 7 percent  in
1988;  rose  consistently  to 15 percent  in 1998  and dipped
to 14 percent  in 1999.
1988 Tax  effort  dipped  from  13 percent  in 1987  to 8 per-
cent  in 1988;  rose  consistently  to 14 percent  in 1994;  de-
clining  since  then  reaching  13 percent  in 1998.
Argentira
Peru 1988 Tax effort was 9 percent  in 1987  and 1988; dipped to
7  percent in 1989; rose consistently to  15.4 percent in
1997; declining since then reaching 14 percent  in 2000.b
1991 Colom~ia Tax  effort  rose  from  10 percent  in 1990  to 13 percent
in 1993  then  settled  at  10 percent  in 1994-1999.
Venez~ela 1994 Tax  effort  dipped  from 14 percent  in 1993  to 3 per-
cent  in 1994;  rose  to 17 percent  in 1997  before  declining
to 12 percent  in 1998  and  13 percent  in 1999.c
Tax effort rose from 12.7 percent  in 1996  to 13.0
percent  in 1997,  then  dropped  to 11.7  percent  in 1998.d
Mexicq 1997
Africa r countries
Ghana 1985 Tax  effort  rose  from  7 percent  in 1984  to 16 percent
In 1996.
Ugand~ 1991 Tax effort rose from 4 percent  in 1990 to 11 percent
in 1996
lemhi, 1993 Tax  effort  dipped  from  19 percent  in 1992  to 15 per-
cent  in 1993  before  increasing  to 19 percent  in 1994,  be-
fore  settling  at 17-18  percent  in 1995-1997.
Keny~ 1995 Tax  effort declined  from 25 percent  in 1994  to 20
percent  in 1999  (with  reduction  in tax  rates).
Tanzaria 1996 Tax  effort  rose  from  11 percent  in 1995  to 12 percent
in 1996  but declined  since  then reaching  10 percent  in
1998.MANASAN 183
Table  3. cQnt'd.
South  Africa 1997 Tax  effort  rose  from  24 percent  in 1996  to 26 percentin 
1999  (with  reduction  in tax  rates).
Rwanda 1998 Tax  effort  rose  from  9.8 percent  in 1997  to 10.1  per-
cent  in 1998;  dipped  to 9.3 percent  in 2000.
Southeast 1 sia
Malaysia 1994 Tax  effort  fairly  stable at  17 percent  since  1993.
.Semi-auton mous RA  in Bolivia (the Ministry of Tax Collection)  became operational  in 1987  but
was  abolishe  in mid-1988  (Taliercio  2001).
b  Decline  in t  x effort starting  in 1998  coincided with replacement  of independent-minded  superin-
tendent  (Rev la?)  with someone  more submissive to the MOF  (Taliercio  2001).
C  Decline in t  x effort in 1998  coincided with the issuance of a decree by President Caldera  that
opened up th  human  resource  management  system  of the SENIATto  ministerial  intervention.
d  In June 199 , the SSI  (subsecretariat  of revenue)  was  re-established  because  of conflict  between
the SAT  and t  e MOF.  At the same time, two measures  were issued that effectively  decimated  the
autonomy  of  e SAT  with respect to personnel  matters  and the issuance of ad ministerial  rulings,
effectively  m rking the demise of the SAT as a semi-autonomous  RA  (Taliercio  2001).
enues in t ddition  to  the  cost. of  retiring  personnel  of  the  old  tax  ad-
ministrati  n.  This  happened  in  Argentina,  Peru,  Venezuela,  and  Zam-
bia.
Mor  over, even in  many of the  countries  that have shown some
degree of success  with the semi-autonomous  RA model,  there  is some
evidence  hat the  gains in  revenue  performance  tends to  be eroded
after  som  time.  For instance,  tax effort  has started to  falter  in  Peru
since 199  .A  drop  in tax effort  has likewise been evident in Argentina
(since 19  ), Colombia  (since 1994), Venezuela (since 1998), Mexico
(since 19  8), Tanzania  (since  1997), and Rwanda (since 2000).  In  all
these cou  tries  with  the  exception  of  Peru, the  deterioration  in  tax
effort was  uch that tax effort  settled at a level that was  just the sam~ or
even lowe  than the pre-reform  level. It is also interesting  that the de-
cline  in ta  effort  in Peru, Venezuela and Mexico  coincided  with  the
weakenin  of the  autonomy  features  of the RAs in these countries.
Relat  d to  this, Taliercio  (2001),  after  assessing  the  experience
of  Bolivia,  Mexico,  Peru, and Venezuela, concludes  that semi-autono-
mous RAs have been  less sustainable  than  expected.  This  occurs  as~HILIPPINEJOURNAL  OF DEVELOPMENT 184
their  utonomous  features are undermined,  if  not eliminated.  He ar-
gues  at the  main challenge  to the  autonomy  of the RA has been the
gover  ment itself (working  through  the ministry of finance)  in as much
as th  very design of semi-autonomous  RAs gives rise to "dynamic  of
confl.ct  and  competition  between the  government  and the RA."g
aliercio  (2001) also points  out that the executive (i.e., the presi-
dent  f the  republic)  invariably  exerts his influence  on the  tussle be-
twee  the  RA and  the  ministry  of finance.  How the  president  inter-
venes depends  on his incentives  at different  points  during  the  reform
proc  ss. The  support  of the president  appears to have been critical  in
the  c  eation  and  initial  success of  semi-autonomous  RAs in  Latin
Arne  .ca. Taliercio, however, notes several  reasons why presidents would
not c  ntinue  to support  the  reform  they initiated.  First, changing  cir-
cums ances may increase  the  president's  need  for  political  support.
For  i  stance, President  Caldera  (Venezuela)  needed  to  forge  a new
politO  cal coalition  after the  defection  of some of his partners,  and be-
caus  of this  he agreed to  the  restoration  of ministerial  control  over
the S  NIAT.  Similarly,  in Peru, although  President Fujimori  preserved
the  0 ganizational  form  of the  SUNAT amidst demands from  the min-
ister  f finance  to re-incorporate  the  SUNAT as a Vice  Ministry  of Tax
ColI  cti?ns  under  the  Ministry  of Finance, he compromised  by allow-
ing  t  e minister  of finance  to replace  the  superintendent  of the  RA
with  onieone  more pliable  to its control.  Second, presidents tend  not
to  c  ncern  themselves  closely with  postreform  decisions  relating  to
the s  stainability  of the RA, unlike  "in the  creation stage in which  the
exec  tive oversees important  ex ante  decisions."
Taliercio  (2001) also observes that the creation of a powerful  pro-
refo  m constituency  in the private  sector tends to sustain semi-autono-
mou  RA reform.  This  is exemplified  in  P~ru, where  the  support  of
the  usiness community  and academics has enabled the  SUNAT to re-
sist  e battering  of the  MOF longer  than  in the  other countries.  10
.He  n  tes  that  the  reform  vests  "the  minister  of  finance  with  high  costs,  yet provides  little  in the  way  of
benefi  ." From  a  political  perspective,  the  main  benefit  of reform  is greater  revenues.  Yet,  it is largely  the
presid  nt,  not the  minister,  who  benefits  politically  from  greater  expenditures.  The  main  costs  of the  RA
refor  are  lost  patronage  opportunities,  less  political  control  of  the  tax  agency,  and  less  influence  over
tax  po icymaking.  The  minister  is affected  by  all  these  costs  as  the  RA  reform  removes  a  large  percent-
age  0  ministerial  employees  from  his  control  (which  results  in  a substantially  decreased  budget),  re-
duces  his  political  control  over  the  tax administration,  and  reduces  his  tax  policy  control  by  establishing
anoth  r center  of tax  policy  expertise.  According  to  this  simple  cost-benefit  analysis,  ministers  should
gener  lIy have  incentives  to oppose  the  reform  (even  while  presidents  support  it). Thus,  on  both  admin-
istrati  e and  political  grounds,  finance  ministers  are  likely  to  oppose  semi-autonomous  RAs185 MANASAN
Assess  ent of proposed  laws creating  semi-autonomous  RAs
in the  ilippines
The  ex  erience  of other  countries  with semi-autonomous  revenue au-
thoritie  suggests that not all semi-autonomous revenue authorities  are
created  equal.  Some RAs perform  better  than  other.  The  more  suc-
cessful  nes appear to have a higher  degree of autonomy
In  ernational  experience  in semi-autonomous  RA reform  clearly
shows t  at should  Philippine  authorities  decide  to  adopt the autono-
mous  model,  then  it is must do  it right.  Obviously, this  is a situa-
tion  wh  re half  measures will  not be good enough.  Less than full  au-
tonomy  will  not  only  increase  the  risk  but  also the  costs associated
with  th  reform.
"D  ing it right"  implies  that the new tax agency should  be vested
with  str  ng autonomy-enhancing  features and  accountability  mecha-
nisms.  sing this framework,  Table 4 reviews the provisions  of the three
altern at ve bills  proposing  to  create a semi-autonomous  revenue  au-
thority  t  replace the  BIR and suggests  the  following  measures.
1.  Limit  the size of the board  of directors  to  seven  voting  mem-
bers to enhance  individual  accountability  of members and to
make decision  making  less unwieldy.  However, it is proposed
that commissioner be made a nonvoting  member of the Board.
2.  Government  representatives  to the Board  should  come from
the fiscal oversight  agencies, namely, Department  of Finance
(DOF),  Department  of Budget and Management  (DBM),  and
National  Economic  and Development  Authority  (NEDA).
3.:  Increase the  number  of private  sector representatives  to help
create a constituency  for  reform  in private  sector and to help
insulate  new tax agency from  political  interference.  Appoint-
mept of the first batch of private  sector representatives should
be staggered.
4.  ssign policymaking  functions  (including  establishment  of
tandards and systems) to the Board; assign day-to-day admin-
'stration  and implementation  of standards and systems  to the
ommissioner.
5.  et funding  as fixed  percentage  of  actual  tax collections  in
he previous  year (instead  of  fixing  it between  one and two
10  ApparentlY rCorporate  taxpayers  preferred  the  SUNAT  over  the  prereform  agency  because  by dramati-
cally  reducin  the  amount  of  corruption  in tax  administration,  it reduced  the  costs  of  uncertainty  for  the
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Table  4. Key features  of alternative  house bills  proposing  to create  a new
revenue authority
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Table  4. Cont'd
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(not  as
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Authority)p  rcent  of  actual  collections)  and  provide  for  its automatic
ropriation  and release to eliminate  venue for  negotiation
b  tween  the  executive  as well  as the  legislative  branches  of
g  vernment,  on the one hand, and the revenue authority,  on
th  other. The  provision  for the additional  funding  equal to a
c  rtain  percentage  of the excess collection  over target is not
re  ommended  because it  may lead  to  strategic  behavior  on
t  e part  of the  revenue  authority  in the area of revenue  tar-
g  t setting  and  may be counterproductive.
6.  G ve the new tax agency independence  in the formulation  and
a  ministration  of its human resource  management  system  by
v  sting  the  Board  with  final  appellate  authority  in  cases in-
v  lving promotion,  transfer, assignment, and dismissal.
7.  andate the new tax agency not to give preferential  and prior
ri  hts to  incumbent  BIR employees when recruiting  employ-
e  s to give the .new Commissioner  flexibility  in the  hiring  of
s  and  thus  "safeguard  the  integrity  and  efficiency  of the
i  centive  contract"  with him.
-'.  P ovide for periodic  third-party  performance  audit  of the RA
b  an  entity  to be identified  by the  Board.  The  Commission
0  Audit  is limited  to the financial  audit of the new tax agency.
equire  the  Board  of Directors  of the  new tax agency to  es-
t  blish  a written. code of ethics for  all employees in the  new
t x authority  to  strengthen  accountability  mechanism.
10.  elete  reporting  requirement  to  Congressional  Oversight
ommittee  and the joint  Congressional  Commission as pro-
.ded in the substitute  bill  as this would  tend  to  subject new
t  x agency to  political  interference.
11.  rovide  for separation incentives  over and above benefits and
ratuities  under  existing  laws.
12.  ending  the  organization  of  new tax agency, all  incumbent
ersonnel  of BIR should  continue  to exercise their  duties as
ersonnel  ofBIR  (not the new authority),  otherwise, capture
f  new system by incumbents  will  be fostered  and  cost of es-
blishing  new tax agency will  tend  to be unduly  high.
8
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